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    <title>Netacoding | Cybersecurity, Assembly &amp; Network Research</title>
    <link>https://netacoding.com/</link>
    <description>Recent content on Netacoding | Cybersecurity, Assembly &amp; Network Research</description>
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    <item>
      <title>XOR Encryption in x64 Assembly: Fixed Key, Rolling Key &amp; the lea vs mov Pointer Bug | No libc</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/xor-operations-x64-assembly/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/xor-operations-x64-assembly/</guid>
      <description>Two complete NASM implementations of XOR stream encryption — fixed single-byte key and rolling key that increments every byte — with file read, in-place encrypt, and stdout write, all via raw Linux syscalls. Covers the symmetry property that makes decrypt identical to encrypt, 8-bit register auto wrap-around, and a real pointer bug: mov rdx, [buffer] loads the file data as an address and segfaults, while lea rdx, [buffer] loads the address correctly.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SHA-256 Output Distribution Analysis: Deterministic Cycles, Basin Topology &amp; 42x Rainbow Chain Speedup via CDP [v5]</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/cdp-sha256-structural-analysis/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/cdp-sha256-structural-analysis/</guid>
      <description>CDP (Cyclic Digit-sum Projection) maps SHA-256 hex outputs into a 961-class finite projection space, exposing two deterministic fixed-point cycles, ergodic Markov basin structure, bijective 2-char fingerprinting, and a 42.55x compound lookup index speedup for constrained input spaces. Not documented in existing SHA-256 literature.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Trailer Frame Bug Class: RFC 9114 §4.1 as a Universal HTTP/3 State Machine Attack Surface</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/h3_trailer_bug_class/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/h3_trailer_bug_class/</guid>
      <description>A single RFC 9114-compliant frame type — the trailer HEADERS frame — breaks HTTP/3 state machines across two independent CDN edge implementations and the shared quiche QUIC library used in major Chromium-based browsers. Three distinct manifestations, one root cause.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WebTransport Zombie Connections: RFC 9114 Trailer Frame Triggers Permanent Stream Leak &amp; OOM in Microsoft Edge and Chromium | Protocol RE</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/webtransport-zombie/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/webtransport-zombie/</guid>
      <description>Sending a trailer HEADERS frame without END_STREAM on a WebTransport CONNECT stream causes Microsoft Edge and Chromium to permanently hold QUIC connections open, driving Network Service memory from 6 MB to 339 MB with 5,000 connections before an OOM crash. A secondary bug delivers server datagrams to JS on sessions the H3 layer considers closed. Root cause is in the shared quiche QUIC library. Reported to both MSRC and Google Chrome VRP — closed without fix by both vendors.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ROCm Windows RDNA 4: Fixing hipLaunchKernel 0xC0000005 via Binary Patch</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/amdhip64-patch/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/amdhip64-patch/</guid>
      <description>Every HIP kernel launch crashes with 0xC0000005 on Windows gfx1201. WinDbg trace, root cause in the profiler callback linked list, a wrong first patch that silenced GPU compute, and the correct surgical fix targeting hipProfilerRegisterChunkCallbackExt.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>When Obfuscation Becomes the Signature: Static Analysis of a Go-Based Linux RAT</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/warp-rat-elf-static-analysis/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/warp-rat-elf-static-analysis/</guid>
      <description>Warp/Wraith Linux RAT static analysis: Go binary with ELF section header mangling, oversized LOAD segment, and SSH credential harvesting. Detected without sandbox or dynamic execution — the obfuscation itself is the signature.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>HTTP/3 Trailer HEADERS Frame Triggers Unhandled Exception in Google ESF: 60s Hang &amp; QUIC INTERNAL_ERROR 0x0001 | Protocol RE</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/blog_post_esf_h3/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/blog_post_esf_h3/</guid>
      <description>Sending an RFC 9114-compliant trailer HEADERS frame to music.youtube.com causes Google&amp;#39;s ESF (Edge Side Frontend) to hang for ~60 seconds before closing the connection with QUIC INTERNAL_ERROR (0x0001) — the RFC-defined signal for implementation errors. 100 sequential runs confirm zero rate limiting: the crash occurs at the H3 frame parser layer before any HTTP-layer defense is reachable. Cross-vendor confirmation on a second major CDN provider. Reported to Google VRP twice; closed by automated system both times within minutes.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Windows tcpip.sys ICMP Timestamp Bug: EnableICMPTimestampRep=0 Registry Bypass &amp; RFC 792 Violation | Kernel RE</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/windows-icmp-timestamp-bugs/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/windows-icmp-timestamp-bugs/</guid>
      <description>EnableICMPTimestampRep=0 does not suppress ICMP Timestamp Replies (Type 14) on Windows 11. Ghidra RE of tcpip.sys 10.0.26100.8457 confirms Ipv4pHandleTimestampRequest generates T14 unconditionally, plus a second bug: Receive/Transmit timestamps written little-endian in violation of RFC 792. Only effective mitigation: WFP firewall rule.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ICMP-Ghost: Fileless C2 with ICMP &amp; DNS Tunneling in Pure x64 Assembly | Suricata Bypassed</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/icmp-ghost/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/icmp-ghost/</guid>
      <description>ICMP-Ghost is a fileless, pure x64 Assembly C2 agent with dual-channel ICMP and DNS tunneling, protocol hot-swapping, EDR evasion, and Suricata v8.0.3 bypass. Zero libc, zero disk writes.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ICMP Timestamp Type 13/14 Linux Kernel Internals: RFC 792 Deviations &amp; ftrace Call Chain Analysis</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/icmp-timestamp-internals/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/icmp-timestamp-internals/</guid>
      <description>Depth-8 ftrace analysis of icmp_timestamp() in the Linux kernel: full call chain from ip_rcv() to ICMP Type 14 reply generation, payload length threshold behavior, conntrack interaction, ts_ori unconditional echo across the full 32-bit range, and six documented deviations from RFC 792.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Linux x64 Syscall Table</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/tools/syscall-table/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/tools/syscall-table/</guid>
      <description>Complete Linux x64 syscall reference with pure x64 Assembly examples. Each entry includes register calling convention, obfuscated variants, and real-world usage in security research projects.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>HTTP Request Smuggling: CL.TE, TE.CL &amp; H2 Downgrade | WAF Bypass, Credential Capture &amp; Proxy Chain Exploitation</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/http-request-smuggling/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/http-request-smuggling/</guid>
      <description>HTTP request smuggling exploits Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding parsing differentials between frontend proxies and backend servers. Covers CL.TE/TE.CL/H2 downgrade mechanics, request queue poisoning, WAF bypass, automated credential capture at scale, and detection via differential timing and response desync.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CWE-290 Layer 3: IP Source Spoofing via Missing uRPF | Smurf Amplification, ICMP Leak &amp; Pre-Auth Reflection in ArubaOS</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/cwe-290/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/cwe-290/</guid>
      <description>uRPF absence (CWE-290) at Layer 3 unconditionally trusts IP source addresses — enabling Smurf amplification, ICMP Timestamp information leaks, and pre-auth reflection attacks with no authentication required. Confirmed in ArubaOS AOS-8 (Build 95415). Covers RFC 3704 strict/loose uRPF, asymmetric routing deployment gap, Scapy PoC, Suricata detection rules, and Linux/Cisco mitigation.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EtherLeak: ICMP Kernel Memory Disclosure via Ethernet Padding | CVE-2003-0001 &amp; CVE-2021-3031</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/etherleak-reloaded/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/etherleak-reloaded/</guid>
      <description>EtherLeak leaks NIC DMA ring buffer memory through ICMP Echo replies by trusting IP Total Length over actual frame length. CVE-2003-0001, CVE-2021-3031 (Palo Alto PA-series), TTL=0 evasion, and a working Scapy PoC.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Smurf Amplification in 2026: Pre-Auth ICMP Reflection via L2 Broadcast | CVE-1999-0513 &amp; Enterprise VLAN</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/smurf-amplification/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/smurf-amplification/</guid>
      <description>RFC 2644 disabled directed broadcast at router level — not L2 broadcast domains. Missing uRPF (CWE-290) &#43; broadcast ICMP reply (CWE-406) enables Smurf amplification from same-VLAN adjacency with no authentication. 100-host broadcast domain = 100x amplification at 100 req/s → 7.2 Mbps victim flood. Two-machine Scapy PoC, Suricata rules, and enterprise wireless infrastructure confirmation.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ArubaOS 8.13.2.0 Pre-Auth ICMP Buffer Over-read: EtherLeak via TTL=0 &#43; IP Total Length | HPE Bugcrowd</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/ghost-leak/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/ghost-leak/</guid>
      <description>ArubaOS 8.13.2.0 leaks up to 18 bytes of NIC DMA buffer per ICMP Echo via inflated IP Total Length (CWE-126). TTL=0 packets are processed in violation of RFC 791, making the attack invisible to IDS, firewalls, and SIEM. Same mechanism as CVE-2003-0001 and CVE-2021-3031 (Palo Alto PA-series). 27/27 packets confirmed via pcap. HPE Bugcrowd closed as N/A.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ArubaOS 8.13.2.0 Pre-Auth XXE → OOB SSRF &amp; Internal Port Scan on Port 32000 | CWE-611 HPE Bugcrowd</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/xxe-ssrf/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/xxe-ssrf/</guid>
      <description>ArubaOS 8.13.2.0 port 32000/TCP exposes an unauthenticated XML parser (default-xml-api AAA profile) that resolves SYSTEM external entities. Confirmed: OOB SSRF via wire-level pcap, internal port scan (9 ports confirmed open), attacker DTD fetch, and target sshd log showing 127.0.0.1-sourced HTTP request. CVSS 9.3 Critical. Bugcrowd closed as theoretical despite 4 independent evidence items.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ArubaOS 8.13.2.0 Smurf Amplification &amp; ICMP Reflection: Pre-Auth uRPF Missing &#43; Broadcast Reply | HPE Bugcrowd N/A</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/smurf-reflection/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/smurf-reflection/</guid>
      <description>ArubaOS 8.13.2.0 accepts ICMP Echo Requests with spoofed source IPs (no uRPF/BCP38) and replies to broadcast source addresses — enabling Smurf amplification from L2 adjacency. Two independent pcap captures (attacker &#43; victim) confirm unsolicited Echo Reply to a host that sent zero ICMP requests. RFC 1122 §3.2.2.6 violation. Submitted Bugcrowd, closed as expected behavior.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DNS State Exhaustion: Water Torture, NXNS Amplification, TsuNAME &amp; DoT/DoH Socket Starvation</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/dns-state-exhaustion/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/dns-state-exhaustion/</guid>
      <description>DNS resolvers carry exhaustible per-query state: recursive-client tables, pending-query slots, TCP/853 DoT and TCP/443 DoH sockets, delegation chains, and DNSSEC validation trees. Covers slow water torture, NXNS amplification (CVE-2020-8616), TsuNAME cyclic delegation, NRDelegation, and why BIND9/Unbound default ceilings are lower than HTTP.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TCP State Exhaustion: TIME_WAIT Flood, Sockstress Persist Timer Abuse &amp; Conntrack DoS | Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/tcp-state-exhaustion/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/tcp-state-exhaustion/</guid>
      <description>TCP connection capacity is bounded by 4-tuple uniqueness and kernel conntrack table size — not port numbers. Covers TIME_WAIT socket exhaustion, Sockstress (window=0 &#43; Persist Timer loop, 2008), Slowloris-class L7 variants, ip_conntrack_max limits, and net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse/tcp_fin_timeout tuning for defense.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BYOVD vs User-Space Injection: EDR Evasion Comparison | SROP &#43; process_vm_writev vs Kernel Driver Exploit</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/byovd-vs_userspace_inj/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/byovd-vs_userspace_inj/</guid>
      <description>BYOVD exploits signed vulnerable kernel drivers to reach Ring 0 and terminate EDR processes (Windows). User-space SROP injection uses ptrace&#43;sigreturn&#43;process_vm_writev to run inside a trusted host process identity without touching Ring 0 (Linux). Empirical results: 0/65 VirusTotal, SROP injection and process_vm_writev invisible to behavioral sandbox. Threat model, privilege ring, and detection surface comparison.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FUSE Linux Kernel Integer Overflow: pgoff_t Arithmetic Wrap, Maple Tree OOB Write &amp; VMA Corruption</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/fuse-boundary-mathematics-pgoff-overflow/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/fuse-boundary-mathematics-pgoff-overflow/</guid>
      <description>FUSE daemon controls i_size — setting it to 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF wraps pgoff_t arithmetic in mm/filemap.c and mm/mmap.c, inverting page cache loop invariants and turning vma_merge() into an OOB-write primitive on Maple Tree-backed kernels (5.15&#43;).</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FUSE Linux Kernel UAF: drop_caches &#43; SIGKILL Race Condition | DirtyCred Use-After-Free &amp; LPE</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/fuse-async-abort-race-double-put/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/fuse-async-abort-race-double-put/</guid>
      <description>fuse_req borrows inode references without incrementing i_count. A three-actor race between SIGKILL, drop_caches inode eviction, and delayed fuse_abort_conn teardown yields a refcount decrement on freed SLUB slab memory — DirtyCred-class struct cred UAF in three syscalls.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FUSE Trust Boundary Attack: Malicious Daemon i_size Desync → Kernel Heap Overflow via finit_module &amp; kexec</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/fuse-trust-boundary-and-size-desync/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/fuse-trust-boundary-and-size-desync/</guid>
      <description>An unprivileged FUSE daemon holds semantic authority over i_size — lying in vfs_getattr responses desynchronizes kernel allocation size from ingestion size in kernel_read_file(). finit_module(2), the firmware loader, and kexec_file_load(2) become kmalloc-4k slab overflow primitives. Full VFS trust boundary analysis and virtio-fs attack surface.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pure Assembly vs C/Rust Malware Evasion: 0/65 VirusTotal, SROP CFG Bypass &amp; Zero Compiler Artifacts</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/language_malware-evasion/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/language_malware-evasion/</guid>
      <description>Pure x64 Assembly eliminates compiler artifacts (GCC prologues, LLVM panic stubs, CRT startup code) that AV/EDR engines fingerprint. Empirical results: 0/65 VirusTotal detections, SROP injection and process_vm_writev invisible to behavioral sandbox. CMOV-based CFG flattening defeats heuristic graph analysis. Backed by Ianni et al. (SEBD 2019) on exotic compiler evasion.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>LockBit 5.0 Linux Malware Analysis: ChaCha20 &#43; Curve25519 Offline Encryption, strace Evasion &amp; IOCs</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/lockbit5-analysis/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/lockbit5-analysis/</guid>
      <description>Full reverse engineering of LockBit 5.0 Linux (LINUX Locker v1.01 amd64): offline-capable ChaCha20&#43;Curve25519 encryption, strace anti-analysis evasion, aggressive free space wiping, and zero network activity during encryption. eBPF dynamic tracing, Ghidra static RE, triple-confirmed network behavior, and complete IOC list.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI Agent Security: Why Container Isolation &amp; Linux RBAC Beat AI Firewalls | Kernel-Level Access Control</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/ai-universal-rule/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/ai-universal-rule/</guid>
      <description>AI firewalls attempt to govern autonomous agents by parsing semantic intent — a probabilistic solution to a deterministic security problem. Linux kernel primitives (containers, RBAC, namespaces, EPERM) provide deterministic access control that AI agents cannot bypass through prompt injection or semantic manipulation. Why minimum privilege &#43; container isolation is the only architecturally sound approach.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>LCG Jitter x64 Assembly: Randomized nanosleep for C2 Beaconing Evasion &amp; SOC Behavioral Detection Bypass</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/lcg-jitter/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 10:00:00 +0300</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/lcg-jitter/</guid>
      <description>Fixed-interval beaconing is trivially detected by SOC behavioral analysis. LCG-based jitter seeds rdtsc hardware entropy through Numerical Recipes constants (a=1664525, c=1013904223), applies modular range mapping, and delivers uniform random delays in [100ms, 1000ms) via sys_nanosleep — breaking periodic pattern detection with 2^32 LCG period and no external dependencies.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CFG Flattening with CMOV: Antivirus &amp; EDR Evasion via Control Flow Obfuscation in x64 Assembly</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/polymorphic/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/polymorphic/</guid>
      <description>NGAV and AI-powered EDRs rely on Control Flow Graph analysis to detect malicious binaries. Replacing conditional jumps with CMOV instructions eliminates branching entirely — producing a flat CFG that defeats Ghidra heuristics, AI feature extraction, and static signature engines without a single JMP.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Phantom Evasion Loader: SROP &#43; process_vm_writev Direct Cross-Memory Shellcode Injection | EDR &amp; Falco Bypass in x64 Assembly</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/phantom-evasion-loader-blog/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/phantom-evasion-loader-blog/</guid>
      <description>Phantom Evasion Loader injects shellcode into a live process using SROP (rt_sigreturn syscall 15) to hide ptrace calls from EDR monitors, and process_vm_writev (syscall 311) for single-shot direct cross-memory payload write — bypassing PTRACE_POKEDATA behavioral detection. XOR-decrypted in-memory payload. Confirmed: 0/65 VirusTotal, SROP and injection invisible to Falco eBPF and Hatching Triage.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>VESQER: DPCM&#43;RLE Hybrid Shellcode Compression in x64 Assembly | C2 Payload Size Reduction &amp; OPSEC</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/compressdpcm-rle/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/compressdpcm-rle/</guid>
      <description>VESQER implements a DPCM&#43;RLE hybrid compression pipeline in pure x64 Assembly with zero external dependencies — designed for C2 payload compression. DPCM delta-encodes byte-level differences to reduce entropy variance; RLE collapses repeated delta runs. Full algorithm design, x64 Assembly implementation, compression ratio analysis, and integration with fileless C2 payloads.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Position Independent Code (PIC) in x64 Assembly: Stack Anchor Technique, Sectionless Shellcode &amp; ASLR-Safe Payloads</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/pic-entry/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/pic-entry/</guid>
      <description>PIC shellcode uses RIP-relative addressing instead of absolute addresses, remaining functional regardless of load address — required for ASLR-bypassing payloads. Covers the Stack Anchor technique (sub rsp&#43;and rsp&#43;mov rbp), sectionless execution without .data/.bss sections, rep movsb template copying from read-only .text to writable stack, and runtime R/W memory management in pure x64 Assembly.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TCP Reverse Shell in Pure x64 Assembly: PIC Shellcode, Syscall Chain &amp; dup2 FD Redirection | No libc</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/reverse_shell-assembly/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/reverse_shell-assembly/</guid>
      <description>Complete TCP reverse shell in libc-free pure x64 Assembly using PIC Stack Anchor architecture: sys_socket(41) → sys_connect(42) → sys_dup2(33) loop redirects stdin/stdout/stderr to socket FD → sys_execve(59) spawns /bin/sh. RIP-relative addressing ensures payload works under ASLR. No dependencies, no compiler artifacts, production-ready shellcode pattern.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bare-Metal HTTP Server in x86_64 Assembly: sys_sendfile Zero-Copy, Raw Sockets &amp; Path Traversal Prevention | No libc</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/assembly-httpserver/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 29 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/assembly-httpserver/</guid>
      <description>Complete HTTP/1.1 server in pure x86_64 Assembly with zero external dependencies: sys_socket(41)→sys_bind(49)→sys_listen(50)→sys_accept(43)→sys_read(0) request parsing, SCASB/LODSB path traversal (../) detection, sys_fstat(5) file size, sys_sendfile(40) zero-copy kernel-to-NIC file transfer. Binary to ASCII IP conversion via bswap &#43; manual div loop.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>About Me</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/about/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 13:50:00 +0300</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/about/</guid>
      <description>Introduction to Netacoding: Research focusing on Assembly language, Network Protocol Analysis, CVE research, and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT).</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Contact</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/contact/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 13:45:00 +0300</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/contact/</guid>
      <description>Get in touch for technical inquiries, project collaborations, or feedback regarding low-level security and network research.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RDTSC Network Timing &amp; Jitter Analysis in x64 Assembly: Nanosecond Packet Measurement &amp; SOC Detection Evasion</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/statistical-jitter/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 11:31:43 +0300</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/statistical-jitter/</guid>
      <description>RDTSC (Read Time-Stamp Counter) measures CPU cycles between packet transmission and reception with nanosecond precision — bypassing OS clock jitter from gettimeofday/clock_gettime. Covers inter-packet delay variance (jitter formula |D_i - D_{i-1}|), Gaussian vs anomalous timing distribution, CPUID/RDTSCP serialization fences, and timing analysis applications for C2 beaconing evasion and network observability.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>memfd_create Linux: Fileless In-Memory Execution &amp; Anti-Forensics via Syscall 319 in x64 Assembly</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/volatile-storage/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 11:30:25 +0300</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/volatile-storage/</guid>
      <description>memfd_create (syscall 319) creates anonymous RAM-backed file descriptors invisible to ls and standard forensic tools — no disk writes, no /tmp traces, no permanent inode. Full x64 Assembly implementation covering MFD_CLOEXEC, fd sealing, and Blue Team detection via /proc/pid/fd/ and eBPF auditd.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Linux x64 Assembly Syscall ABI: Registers, File Descriptors &amp; .bss Segment | open, read, write, exit</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/syscall-bss/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 11:27:01 +0300</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/syscall-bss/</guid>
      <description>Linux x64 syscall ABI: RAX=syscall ID, RDI=first arg, RSI=second arg, RDX=third arg. Covers sys_open(2), sys_read(0), sys_write(1), sys_close(3), sys_exit(60) with file descriptor lifecycle, .bss vs .data memory tradeoffs, and a complete file reader implementation in pure x64 Assembly without libc.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-6019: udisks2 TOCTOU Race Condition → Local Privilege Escalation | Polkit Bypass &amp; SUID Exploit</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/udisks2-cve_lpe/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 11:20:47 +0300</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/udisks2-cve_lpe/</guid>
      <description>CVE-2025-6019: udisks2 XFS resize creates /tmp/blockdev.XXXXXX mount points without immediately applying nosuid — a TOCTOU race window allows SUID binary execution before the flag is set. Polkit bypass via ~/.pam_environment seat0 spoofing, XFS image crafting with mkfs.xfs Protofile, and D-Bus flood trigger. Confirmed on openSUSE Leap 15.6 (kernel 6.4.0).</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>eBPF Linux: XDP Packet Filtering, Kprobes Runtime Tracing &amp; Kernel-Level Malware Detection</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/ebpf/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/ebpf/</guid>
      <description>eBPF runs sandboxed bytecode inside the Linux kernel via JIT compilation — no kernel modules, no source changes. Covers XDP for line-rate packet filtering and DDoS mitigation, kprobes/uprobes for syscall-level runtime tracing, and eBPF-based behavioral malware detection that captures execve, open, and connect calls regardless of language or evasion technique.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ICMP C2 Evasion: IDS/IPS Bypass via Traffic Mimicry, RDTSC Timestamping &amp; Stateless Port Knocking | Suricata</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/advanced-evasion-techniques/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/advanced-evasion-techniques/</guid>
      <description>Multi-layer ICMP C2 evasion: RDTSC hardware timestamps mimic legitimate Linux ping signatures, 56-byte/32-byte OS-aligned payloads defeat DPI volume anomalies, stateless Magic Sequence port knocking eliminates persistent connections, memfd_create enables fileless execution, and LCG jitter breaks SOC behavioral baselines. Confirmed bypass against Suricata v8.0.3.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ICMP OS Fingerprinting &amp; NIDS Evasion: Traffic Mimicry via Linux/Windows Payload Signatures in x64 Assembly</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/network-fingerprinting/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/network-fingerprinting/</guid>
      <description>Every OS leaves a unique ICMP fingerprint: Linux sends 64-byte payloads with 8-byte RDTSC timestamps, Windows sends 32-byte alphabetical sequences. Covers OS-specific TTL and payload signatures, DPI evasion via traffic mimicry, and x64 Assembly implementation of NIDS-bypassing ICMP packet structures.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ICMP Packet Sniffer in x64 Assembly: Raw Socket Capture, Header Stripping &amp; Binary-to-ASCII IP | No libc</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/icmp_sniffer/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/icmp_sniffer/</guid>
      <description>Zero-dependency ICMP sniffer in pure x64 Assembly: sys_socket(41) with AF_INET&#43;SOCK_RAW&#43;IPPROTO_ICMP filters to ICMP-only traffic, sys_recvfrom reads raw frames, manual 28-byte header strip (20B IP &#43; 8B ICMP) via lea rsi,[buf&#43;28] reaches payload, custom div-based Integer-to-ASCII engine converts binary IP octets to dotted-decimal without libc or printf.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ICMP Type 3 Protocol Encapsulation: Nested ICMP Firewall Bypass &amp; DPI Evasion via 0xFFFF Boundary Flaw</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/icmp_encapsulation/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/icmp_encapsulation/</guid>
      <description>ICMP Type 3 (Destination Unreachable) mandates reflection of the original IP header plus 8 bytes — a field attackers control entirely. Nested ICMP encapsulates secondary protocol headers inside the mandatory reflection segment, bypassing stateful firewalls that classify Type 3 as benign error traffic. 0xFFFF boundary manipulation causes DPI engines to misidentify packet boundaries and skip payload analysis.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>IP Endianness in x64 Assembly: Big-Endian Network Byte Order to ASCII | Single-Pass div Algorithm Without inet_ntoa</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/algorithmforprinting-ip_addresses/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/algorithmforprinting-ip_addresses/</guid>
      <description>sockaddr_in delivers IP addresses in Big-Endian network byte order — x86/x64 reads them Little-Endian, producing reversed output like 5.1.168.192 instead of 192.168.1.5. Single-pass backward-build algorithm: reads IP octets from offset 7→4, builds ASCII string from buffer end→start via div/10 &#43; add 0x30, inserts dot separators without a second reversal loop. Zero libc, zero inet_ntoa.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Linux Anti-Debugging &amp; Memory Dump Prevention: ptrace &#43; prctl in x64 Assembly | EDR Evasion</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/anti-analysis/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/anti-analysis/</guid>
      <description>Implement Linux process self-defense in pure x64 Assembly: PTRACE_TRACEME blocks debugger attachment at kernel level, PR_SET_DUMPABLE=0 prevents core dumps and memory acquisition. Includes runtime syscall obfuscation to bypass YARA static signatures.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RFC 1071 One&#39;s Complement Checksum in x64 Assembly: ICMP Carry Folding, Odd-Byte Handling &amp; Packet Verification</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/posts/rfc-1071/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/posts/rfc-1071/</guid>
      <description>RFC 1071 checksum computes a 16-bit one&amp;#39;s complement sum over the entire packet in 2-byte chunks. x64 Assembly implementation: word-by-word accumulation loop, odd-byte final block, carry folding via shr/and/add/adc, not ax inversion for final checksum. Required for ICMP packets to pass kernel validation — malformed checksum causes silent drop before delivery.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Encoders &amp; Decoders</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/tools/encoders/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/tools/encoders/</guid>
      <description>Ultimate client-side payload conversion tool: Base64, Hex, URL, HTML, Binary, Unicode, JWT and ROT13. (Sandboxed &amp;amp; DoS Protected)</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hash Generator</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/tools/hash-generator/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/tools/hash-generator/</guid>
      <description>Client-side MD5, SHA-series, and SHA-3 hash calculator powered by CryptoJS. (DoS Protected)</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>IP Subnet &amp; CIDR Calculator</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/tools/ip-calc/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/tools/ip-calc/</guid>
      <description>Advanced client-side IPv4 network calculator for penetration testers. (Hardened)</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAC Address Tools</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/tools/mac-tools/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/tools/mac-tools/</guid>
      <description>Advanced MAC Formatter and Random Generator (Spoofer). (100% Client-Side &amp;amp; Hardened)</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Secure Password Generator</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/tools/password-gen/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/tools/password-gen/</guid>
      <description>Cryptographically secure, zero-server password and passphrase generator using Web Crypto API.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SysAdmin &amp; Forensics</title>
      <link>https://netacoding.com/tools/sysadmin-tools/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://netacoding.com/tools/sysadmin-tools/</guid>
      <description>Linux Chmod permission calculator and Unix Epoch Timestamp converter for DFIR analysts. (Hardened)</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
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